Time Inconsistency Problem

Policy problem that can result if a policymaker has the ability, in the future, to alter its strategy in a way that is inconsistent both with its own initial announced intentions as well as the desires and strategies of private individuals.

Greg Mankiw demonstrates the time inconsistency problem in a simple political example:

"Public policy about negotiating with terrorists over the release of hostages. The announced policy of many nations is that they will not negotiate over hostages. Such an announcement is intended to deter terrorists: if there is nothing to be gained from kidnapping hostages, rational terrorists won't kidnap any. In other words, the purpose of the announcement is to influence the expectations of terrorists and thereby their behavior.

But, in fact, unless the policymakers are credibly committed to the policy, the announcement has little effect. Terrorists know that once hostages are taken, policymakers face an overwhelming temptation to make some concession to obtain the hostages' release. The only way to deter rational terrorists is to take away the discretion of policymakers and commit them to a rule of never negotiating. If policymakers were truly unable to make concessions, the incentive for terrorists to take hostages would be largely eliminated."
This site uses cookies.
Learn more here